Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1989

Norman C. Barber v. Division of Occupation and
Professional : Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; David W. Lund; Assistant Attorney General; attorney for
respondent.
Scott W. Holt; attorney for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Barber v. Division of Occupation, No. 890605 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2251

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

BRIEF
UTAH
•^>5^.*w-u$v3cii^ i

K FU

-A 10
DOCKET NO.

&Stt&£_£&
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

NORMAN C. BARBER,
Case No. 890605-CA

Petitioner,
vs.
THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL
AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH,

Priority 15

Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from an Order of the Division of Occupational
and Professional Licensing of the Department of Commerce
of the State of Utah
SCOTT W. HOLT (#1532)
44 North Main Street
Layton, Utah 84041
Attorney for Petitioner

R. PAUL VAN DAM (#3312)
Attorney General
DAVID W. LUND (#5106)
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State Street
Eleventh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 533-3200
Attorneys for Respondent

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
NORMAN C. BARBER,
Petitioner,

Case No. 890605-CA

vs.
THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL
AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH,

Priority 15

Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from an Order of the Division of Occupational
and Professional Licensing of the Department of Commerce
of the State of Utah
SCOTT W. HOLT (#1532)
44 North Main Street
Layton, Utah 84041
Attorney for Petitioner

R. PAUL VAN DAM (#3312)
Attorney General
DAVID W. LUND (#5106)
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State Street
Eleventh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 533-3200
Attorneys for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
STATUES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

7

ARGUMENT
I.
II.

10
STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
CONTAINED IN THE DIVISION'S ORDER AND ORDER ON
REVIEW ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE . .

III. THE DIVISION DID NOT ERROR IN DENYING PETITIONER
RELIEF ON REVIEW
IV.
V.

10
12
16

THE BOARD MEMBERS FULFILLED THEIR DUTY IN A
RESPONSIBLE AND UNBIASED MANNER

17

THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ENTERED BY THE DIVISION IN THIS CASE ARE CLEAR,
ACCURATE, AND SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE .

20

THE DIVISION'S ORDER REVOKING PETITIONER'S
LICENSES IS IN HARMONY WITH PRIOR PRACTICE IN
SIMILAR MATTERS

21

VI.

CONCLUSION

23

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Cited
Bevans v. Industrial Commission. 790 P.2d 573, 576
(Utah App. 1990)

12

City of Rockford v. County of Winnebago, 186 111. App. 3d 303,
134 111. Dec. 244, 542 N.E.2d 423 (1989)
19
Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63
(Utah App. 1989)

10
10, 16

Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunicutt, 110 Idaho 257,
715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985)

10

Milne Truck Lines v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 1373
(Utah 1986)

21

Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439
(Utah App. 1989)

11, 22

Other Authorities Cited
Rule R151-46b-12 of the Utah Administrative Code
Rule R153-1-1 et seq. of the Utah Administrative Code
Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-1 et seq

16
1
1, 4

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12(l)

16

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1953, as amended)
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l et seq
Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-1-4 and 58-1-16
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (a) (1953, as amended)
Utah Code Ann. § 58-7-1

1, 10
1
16
1
4

ii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §§ 63~46b-116 and 78-2a-3(2)(a)
(1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing properly revoked Petitioner's licenses to practice as a
dentist and to administer and prescribe controlled substances in
the state of Utah pursuant to the requirements of Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-16 (1953, as amended).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
STATUES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
In addition to the jurisdictional statutes referenced
elsewhere in this brief, this case is governed by the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann. § 581-1 et seq., by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-l et seq., and by the Rules of the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing, Utah Administrative
Code, Rule R153-1-1 et seq.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner has filed a Petition for Review of certain
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Recommended Order and an
Order of the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing
of the Department of Commerce of the State of Utah (the
1

"Division") revoking Petitioner's licenses to practice as a
Dentist and to administer and prescribe controlled substances in
the State of Utah, together with the Division's Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law contained in its Order on Review,

The

administrative action against Petitioner's licenses was filed
with the Division on or about August 24, 1988, and the matter
came on for administrative hearing on June 7, 1989, before the
Dentists and Dental Hygienists Board (hereinafter "Board") with
the Honorable J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge,
presiding.

On or about June 22, 1989, the Division issued an

Order adopting the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Recommended Order submitted by the Dental Board.

The Order

revoked Petitioner's licenses to practice as a Dentist and to
prescribe and administer controlled substances in the State of
Utah.

On or about July 3, 1989, Petitioner filed a Request for

Agency Review with the Division.

On or about July 26, 1989, oral

argument on Petitioner's Request for Agency Review was conducted.
On

September 12, 1989, an Order on Review was issued by David E.

Robinson, Director of the Division, affirming the June 22, 1989
Order revoking Petitioner's licenses.

On or about October 20,

1989, Petitioner and the Division entered into a Stipulation to
Conditional Stay of Revocation Pending Judicial Review, which
stayed revocation of Petitioner's licenses pending review by this
2

Court, subject to certain terms and conditions.

Petitioner

subsequently filed this Petition for Judicial Review.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Petitioner is, and at all times relevant to these

proceedings has been, licensed to practice dentistry and to
administer and prescribe controlled substances in the state of
Utah.

(Tr. at 146; R.21 at pg. 2 para. 1; Br. at 5.) 1
2.

On several occasions between 1983 through 1987,

Petitioner molested his twin daughters, who, at the time the
molestations began, were 12 years of age.

The molestations took

place in Petitioner's home until approximately 1985 and included
disrobing of clothing, fondling of the girls' breasts, and
manipulation of their pubic regions.

On several occasions

between 1985 through 1987, Petitioner molested the girls in the
just-described manner at his office after he had performed dental
procedures and during such time as the girls were under the
influence of nitrous oxide and other drugs.

(Br. at 5; R.21 at

pg. 2, para. 2; Tr. at 148-91; R.12 at pg. 1, para, la.)

*For purposes of this Brief, Petitioner's Brief will be
abbreviated as "Br. at
"; the transcript of the hearing
contained in the record will be abbreviated as "Tr. at
"; and
the documentary evidence in the record shall be referred to as
M
"R.
at
, pursuant to the numbers assigned by the Division
when those documents were forwarded to this Court.
3

3.

On or about March, 1988, criminal charges were

initiated against Petitioner on the basis of the above-described
conduct.

On May 17, 1988, in the District Court for the Second

Judicial District, Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of
forcible sexual abuse, a second degree felony.

Petitioner

submitted an Affidavit to the District Court admitting that
between 1986 and February 1987, he did touch the breasts,
buttocks, or genitalia of the girls, or did otherwise take
indecent liberties with them with the intent to arouse or gratify
his sexual desires, and without their consent.

(Br. at 5? R.12

at pg. 2, para. b.)
4.

On or about August 29, 1988, the Division

initiated action against Petitioner's licenses to practice as a
Dentist and to prescribe and administer controlled substances by
filing a Petition alleging that Petitioner violated various
provisions of the Dentists and Dental Hygienists Act and the
Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann.
§§58-7-1 and 58-1-1, et seq., with relation to the sexual abuse
referenced above.
5.

(R.l; Br. at 6.)

On or about April 5, 1989, the Dental Board, by

and through its members, submitted a Memorandum to David E.
Robinson, Director of the Division, requesting that immediate
action be taken against Petitioner's license to practice
4

dentistry based upon numerous complaints from the public and the
fact that Petitioner had been convicted of a felony charge of
sexual abuse.

This action by the Board was prompted by the fact

that the Board felt that Petitioner represented a threat to the
safety and welfare of the public.
6.

(R.16.)

The Memorandum referenced in the previous

paragraph was apparently initiated by Dr. Reinerth, a member of
the Dental Board, after Dr. Reinerth received 26 telephone calls
from members of the public regarding Petitioner.
7.

(Tr. at 11-13.)

Given the existence of the April 5, 1989,

Memorandum from the Dental Board to David E. Robinson, Judge
Eklund, the Administrative Law Judge and Presiding Officer at
hearing, questioned all members of the Dental Board regarding
their impartiality at the initiation of the hearing, held on June
7, 1989.

Each member of the Board indicated the ability to

discharge his or her responsibilities without prejudice, and upon
the basis of the evidence to be presented.

Additionally,

Petitioner's counsel was allowed to voir dire each member of the
Board.

During this questioning it was determined that, aside

from Dr. Reinerth, the only information that any of the Board
members had regarding Petitioner was that two of the remaining
five Board members had read a newspaper article regarding the
case.

At Petitioner's counsel's request, Dr. Reinerth was
5

recused from the hearing, and Petitioner's counsel stated that he
had "no problem" with the other Board members,

(Tr. at 3-14;

R.27 at 3-5.)
8.

On June 7, 1989, the matter came on for heciring

before the Dental Board, and a Stipulation of Facts signed bySheila Page, Assistant Attorney General, and counsel for
Petitioner was received into evidence*
9.

(Tr. at 3; R.12.)

After taking the matter under advisement, the

Board issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a
Recommended Order that Petitioner's licenses to practice
dentistry and to administer and prescribe controlled substances
in the State of Utah be revoked.

On June 22, 1989, David E.

Robinson, Director of the Division, adopted the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order issued by the Dental
Board on behalf of the Division.
10.

(R.21.)

On or about July 3, 1989f Petitioner filed a

Request for Agency Review with the Division, in which Petitioner
asserted substantially the same arguments as are asserted in his
brief before this Court.
11.

(R.22.)

After oral argument on Petitioner's Request for

Agency Review was conducted on July 26, 1989, before J. Steven
Eklund, Administrative Law Judge, and David E. Robinson, Director
of the Division, the Division issued an Order on Review, signed
6

by David E. Robinson, with detailed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, which Order affirmed the Division's Order
dated June 22, 1989, revoking Petitioner's licenses to practice
as a Dentist and to administer and prescribe controlled
substances.
12.

(R.27.)
On or about October 6, 1989, Petitioner filed a

Petition for Review with this Court, seeking review of the Orders
issued by the Division in this case.
13.

(R. 28.)

On or about October 20, 1989, the Division and

Petitioner entered into a Stipulation to Conditional Stay of
Revocation Pending Judicial Review, which allowed Petitioner to
continue to practice dentistry and to prescribe and administer
controlled substances on a restricted basis pending a decision by
this Court on appeal.

(R.30.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In his brief Petitioner argues five points:
1.

That the Dental Board reached "an implied finding

of fact and conclusion of law which was not supported by
substantial evidence."
2.

(Br. at 9-12.)

That the Division erred in not granting Petitioner

relief from the Board's actions where it concluded that the
record did not support the Board's conclusions of law.
12. )
7

(Br. at

3.

That members of the Dental Board were biased, not

impartial, and should have disqualified themselves at hearing,
(Br, at 12-18, )
4.

That the Board failed to make sufficient findings

of fact upon which to base its conclusions of law, and that
therefore the Board's decision to revoke rather than suspend
Petitioner's licenses was arbitrary and capricious,

(Br. at 18-

19,)
5.

That the Board's revocation of Petitioner's

licenses was contrary to the Division's prior practices in
similar matters, and was, therefore, arbitrary and capricious.
(Br. at 19-20.)
Each of Petitioner's arguments is without merit in
light of the record taken as a whole.

Each of the Dental Board's

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is supported by
substantial evidence (indeed overwhelming evidence) when viewed
in light of the entire record.

The Division did not err in

refusing to grant Petitioner relief from the Division's Order
adopting the Board's Recommended Order revoking Petitioner's
licenses where Petitioner's actions, admitted to by stipulation
and testified to repeatedly in the hearing itself, established
gross unprofessional conduct on Petitioner's part, which
Petitioner's own counsel agreed was "heinous" and "more than

8

sufficient for [the Board] to suspend and revoke his license."
(Tr. at 294- )
Both Petitioner and the Administrative Law Judge voir
dired each member of the Dental Board, and after recusing one
member, Petitioner accepted the other members of the Dental
Board, each having testified to his or her impartiality and
ability to act fairly and properly in discharging his or her
responsibilities as Board member in the hearing.

Petitioner's

argument that the Board was biased and not impartial is,
therefore, unsupported by any evidence whatsoever.
The Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are
detailed, well reasoned, and completely supported by substantial
evidence.

Those findings and conclusions amply support (indeed

mandate) the Board's recommendation and the Division's decision
to revoke Petitioner's licenses, and such decision is in no way
arbitrary and capricious.
Finally, Petitioner has cited no authority or example
to support his argument that the Division's decision to revoke
his licenses was contrary to prior practices and/or that such
decision was arbitrary and capricious.

In fact, the decision to

revoke Petitioner's licenses was in complete harmony with prior
practices of the Division, and as counsel for Petitioner has
admitted, was fully justified by Petitioner's conduct.

9

ARGUMENT
I-

STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1953, as amended) of the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act governs judicial review of
formal adjudicative proceedings of administrative agencies in
this State,

That section provides in relevant part as follows:

The appellate court shall grant relief
only if, on the basis of the agency's record,
it determines that a person seeking judicial
review has been substantially prejudiced by
any of the following:
(g) the agency action is based upon a
determination of fact, made or implied by the
agency, that is not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court[.]
Commenting upon this "substantial evidence" test, this
Court stated, in Grace Drilling Co, v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d
63 (Utah App. 1989), as follows:
Substantial evidence is "more than a mere
'scintilla' of evidence . . . though
'something less than the weight of the
evidence.'" (Quoting Idaho State Ins. Fund
v, Hunicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 715 P.2d 927, 930
(1985) and Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 620
(1966)). "Substantial evidence is 'such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'"
Id.
In applying the "substantial evidence test,"
we review the ''whole record" before the
court, and this review is distinguishable
10

"from both a de novo review and the 'any
competent evidence' standard of review."
It is also important to note that the "whole
record test" necessarily requires that a
party challenging the Board's Findings of
Fact must marshall all of the evidence
supporting the findings and show that despite
the supporting facts, and in light of the
conflicting or contradictory evidence, the
findings are not supported by substantial
evidence. (Citations omitted)
In undertaking such a review, this court will
not substitute its judgment as between two
reasonably conflicting views, even though we
may have come to a different conclusion had
the case come before us for de novo review,
(Citations omitted). It is the province of
the Board, not the appellate courts, to
resolve conflicting evidence, and where
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the
same evidence, it is for the Board to draw
the inferences, (Citation omitted)
Id, at 68 (Footnotes omitted).
In reviewing mixed questions of law and fact this Court
applies an intermediate standard of "reasonableness and
rationality."

Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review, 775 P. 2d

439 (Utah App. 1989).

Under this standard, a court "will not

disturb the Board's application of its factual findings to the
law unless its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness
and rationality."

J[d. at 442.

Finally, its reviewing pure interpretations of law, the
courts will apply a "correction-of-error" standard, which this
11

Court has stated means that the agency's interpretations of
statute will be supported if not erroneous.

See Bevans v.

Industrial Commission, 790 P,2d 573, 576 (Utah App, 1990).
In the present case, Petitioner has attacked certain of
the Board's Findings of Fact, and has also attacked the
Division's application of facts to the applicable rules and
statutes, namely, the determination that Petitioner's
unprofessional conduct should result in revocation of his
licenses.

The former argument is governed by the "substantial

evidence" test, and the latter is governed by the standard of
"reasonableness and rationality,"

Additionally, Petitioner has

challenged the Board's impartiality, the sufficiency of the
Board's Findings of Fact, and has alleged that the Division's
revocation of Petitioner's licenses was contrary to the
Division's prior practices.

Each of these arguments will be

addressed below,
II. THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW CONTAINED IN THE DIVISION'S ORDER AND
ORDER ON REVIEW ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.
In the Conclusions of Law issued by the Dental Board,
adopted by the Division, and later modified slightly on agency
review, the Board found that Petitioner committed unprofessional
conduct compelling the conclusion that Petitioner's licenses
should be revoked.

(R.21 at 4-6.)
12

Petitioner argues that but

for certain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which,
Petitioner asserts, are not supported by substantial evidence,
the Board "would normally have placed the Petitioner-Appellant on
some sort of probationary status, which was what the PetitionerAppellant had urged the Board to do throughout the proceeding."
(Br. at 10.)

Petitioner cites no precedent or rationale for this

bald assumption.

Petitioner then quotes portions of the

following Conclusions of Law reached by the Board:
However, the nature of Respondent's misdeeds
was significantly altered when he
subsequently utilized his licensure to
facilitate his continued criminal conduct.
The combination of nitrous oxide and chloral
hydrate, which Respondent administered to the
two girls, would have produced a level of
anesthesia much greater than that necessary
to merely allay whatever apprehensions they
may have had as patients during the dental
procedures which Respondent performed.
Further, the excessive amounts of chloral
hydrate, which Respondent administered,
created a serious risk of injury or death to
both patients. In so doing, Respondent
failed to consistently act in the best
interest of his two patients, and thus,
violated the fundamental ethic of any health
care professional. Given Respondent's prior
sexual misconduct involving the two girls, it
is clearly obvious that he willfully
maltreated them in order to satisfy his own
desires.
The lengthy duration of Respondent's
reprehensible misconduct reflects a serious
problem. Further, the use of his
professional standing and access to
medication to perpetrate his misconduct
mandates that a severe sanction be entered in
13

this case. Notwithstanding the psychological
evaluation which was conducted and
Respondent's assertion that his dental
practice should be allowed to continue,
Respondents egregious misuse of his license
compels the conclusion that said license
should longer be available to him.
(R.21 at 5-6.)
Contrary to Petitioner's assertions, with one minor
exception which was corrected on agency review, each of the
Board's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
including those referenced above, is supported by substantial
evidence in the record.
In its Order on Review (R.27 at 6-8) the Division,
under the signature of David E. Robinson, its Director, sets
forth a detailed summary of the evidence presented at the
administrative hearing regarding Petitioner's unprofessional
conduct.

This summary contains specific citations to the record,

and sets forth the evidence supporting the Findings of Fact
referenced above.

The Division's summary of the evidence was

prepared in reference to the same argument which Petitioner is
now making on appeal.

For the sake of brevity, the Division

adopts the summary of evidence contained in the Order on Review
and will not reproduce it in this Brief.

It is clear from the

record, including the Stipulation of Facts (R.12), that all of
the Findings of Fact ultimately entered by the Division, and the
14

Conclusions of Law based thereon, are supported by substantial
evidence.
In the Order on Review the Division modified one
statement made in the Board's Conclusions of Law.

That statement

was: "Further, the excessive amount of chloral hydrate, which
Respondent administered, created a serious risk of injury or
death to both patients•"

(R.27 at 8.)

The Order on Review

states:
The record does not support a finding that
Respondent administered an excessive amount
of chloral hydrate as to have created any
serious risk of injury or death to either
patient and there is no sufficient evidence
to find that his conduct created a lifethreatening situation for his daughters.
Nevertheless, Respondent's calculated use of
the medications in question for a completely
inappropriate purposey clearly sustains the
Board's conclusion that Respondent failed to
consistently act in the best interest of his
two patients and that he thus violated the
fundamental ethic of any health care
professional. Simply put, the record
sustains those Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law which were otherwise
entered by the Board.
(R.27 at 8-9; emphasis added.)
While the Division found that the Board had incorrectly
concluded that Petitioner's conduct created a serious risk of
death to his daughters, Division Director David E. Robinson, who
was present at the hearing and participated therein, concluded on
review that despite this error, which he corrected, "the record
15

sustained the other Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
entered by the Board,"

(R,21 at 9•)

Petitioner has failed to

"marshall all of the evidence supporting the findings and show
that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the
contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by
substantial evidence."

Grace Drilling Co. r 776 P.2d at 68.

Petitioner's argument that the Board's Findings of Fact are not
supported by the record is, therefore, without merit.
III. THE DIVISION DID NOT ERROR IN DENYING
PETITIONER RELIEF ON REVIEW.
Petitioner argues that the Administrative Law Judge,
whom, Petitioner erroneously asserts, entered the Order on
Review, erred in that he failed to grant Petitioner relief on
review.

In fact, David E. Robinson, Director of the Division,

entered the Order of Review, not the Administrative Law Judge.
(R.27 at 14.

David E. Robinson, for and on behalf of the

Division, has authority to enter orders in administrative cases
brought before the Division pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-1-4
and 58-1-16.

Additionally, the Director, not the Administrative

Law Judge, has the authority to, and in this case did, enter an
appropriate Order on Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b12(1) and Rule R151-46b-12 of the Utah Administrative Cede.
Petitioner's argument that the Administrative Law Judge erred in
not granting Petitioner relief is, therefore, without merit, and
16

the Division Director, who is charged with entering final orders
both after hearing and on review, appropriately made changes to
the Board's Findings of Fact, and concluded, as did the Board,
that Petitioner's actions required revocation of his licenses.
Petitioner has failed to establish any reason why the Division's
actions constituted error, nor has he explained why the Director,
who has ultimate authority to enter final orders, did so
improperly,
IV. THE BOARD MEMBERS FULFILLED THEIR DUTY
IN A RESPONSIBLE AND UNBIASED MANNER,
Petitioner argues that the Board members who heard this
case were biased and not impartial and should have disqualified
themselves. (Br, at 12-18,)
record.

The argument is unsupported by the

Each Board member acted in a responsible and forthright

manner, and the decision to revoke Petitioner's licenses should
be upheld.

Contrary to Petitioner's assertions, the record in

this case shows that the Board acted in a professional and
unbiased manner.

Before hearing the facts, the Administrative

Law Judge, at counsels' request, polled each Board member to
ensure Petitioner a fair hearing.

One Board member was recused

at Petitioner's counsel's request after stating she had received
phone calls from individuals regarding the case.

After careful

examination, free from further objection, the Judge determined
that the remaining Board members were able to act in a fair and
17

impartial manner, and Petitioner's counsel indicated acceptance
of the Board- (Br. at 13-14.)
Petitioner has failed to show that the Board members
were biased, choosing rather to characterize their efforts to
become fully informed by asking questions of witnesses as somehowinappropriate.

Petitioner accuses the Board of trying to impeach

witnesses, of displaying preconceived opinions, and of testifying
when they were unqualified. (Br. at 14-17.)

A review of the

record reveals that these claims are unfounded.

What are

characterized as improprieties were in fact diligent efforts by
Board members to explore the relevant issues and to afford
Petitioner a fair hearing.

Not only was this the right of each

Board member, it was their duty.

There is no support for any

claim that the members of the Board acted inappropriately toward
any of the witnesses, nor that they showed anything but a
diligent effort to get at the truth.
In Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975), the Wisconsin
Medical Examining Board brought an action to suspend the license
of a practicing physician over the physician's objection that the
Board was biased because the Board had conducted the preliminary
investigation.

The U.S. Supreme Court stated that members of the

State Board were not precluded from holding an adversary hearing
on the matter even though the charges evolved from the Bocird's
18

own investigation.

The Court explained the heavy burden

associated with proving bias in an administrative adjudication.
The Court stated, "[Showing] bias in administrative adjudication
has a much more difficult burden of persuasion to carry-

It must

overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving
as adjudicators."

JEd,. at 47.

In the instant case Petitioner has

failed to overcome this presumption of honesty and integrity of
the Board members.
In addition to Petitioner's failure to demonstrate
bias, Petitioner waived the right to appeal this issue by failing
to object to the presence of particular Board members during the
hearing.

If the issue of bias is to be preserved for appeal,

objection must be made at the time of the hearing.

Petitioner

failed to object to individual Board members with the exception
of Ms. Reinerth who was recused. (Br. at 13-14.)

In City of

Rockford v. County of Winnebago, 186 111. App. 3d 303, 134 111.
Dec. 244, 542 N.E.2d 423 (1989), Rockford City claimed that the
County Board's denial, after hearing, of the City's application
for approval of a landfill site was biased and fundamentally
unfair due to Board member's having received ex parte
from concerned individuals.

contacts

Several members of the Board were

recused, and the decision was made by nondisqualified Board
members.

Id. at 430.

The court stated that the Petitioner had
19

waived its claim of bias or prejudice because the claim "must be
asserted promptly after knowing of the alleged disqualification,
since it would be improper to allow a party to withhold a claim
of bias until it obtains an unfavorable ruling."

JEd. at 431.

Likewisef in the instant case, each Board member was questioned,
with one member being recused.

No objection was lodged as to any

of the remaining Board members, and the record indicates that
none of them had any ex parte contact which would have required
recusal.

Using the language of Rockford, it would be "improper

to allow [Petitioner] to withhold a claim of bias until [he]
obtains an unfavorable ruling."

JEd. at 431.

Therefore,

Petitioner has waived his right to claim bias, and the decision
of the Board and the Division should be upheld.
V. THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW ENTERED BY THE DIVISION IN THIS CASE ARE
CLEAR, ACCURATE, AND SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.
Petitioner argues, without providing any support
whatsoever, that "the Board failed to find Findings of Fact which
support their Conclusions of Law and recommendation in this
matter."

(Br.18.)

A cursory review of the Board's Findings of

Fact (R.21), as well as those entered by the Division in its
Order on Review (R.27), reveals that the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law based thereon are accurate, concise, and
supported by substantial evidence.
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The Board and the Division

both entered findings sufficient to support the conclusions of
law reached on all material issues.

Petitioner has provided no

example or reason why the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
do not meet the standard annunciated in Milne Truck Lines v.
Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 1373 (Utah 1986) and his
argument is without merit.
VI. THE DIVISION'S ORDER REVOKING
PETITIONER'S LICENSES IS IN HARMONY WITH
PRIOR PRACTICE IN SIMILAR MATTERS.
Petitioner argues that the Division's decision to
revoke his licenses rather than place him on probation was
arbitrary and capricious and contrary to the Division's pirior
practice.

(Br. at 19-20.)

Petitioner's citations to the record

do not support this argument, nor does he provide and basis for
his claim that the decision is arbitrary.

As with Petitioner's

other arguments, this issue was addressed fully by the Division
in its Order on Review.

(R.27 at 9-11.)

Without reproducing the

entire explanation, briefly, since 1987, two (2) orders have been
issued by the Division involving dentists who engaged in sexual
misconduct.

In one case, a dentist who engaged in sexual

misconduct with his nine-year old son had his licenses placed on
probation where there "was no evidence that the just-described
misconduct occurred relative to any dentist-patient relationship
. . ."

(R.27 at pg. 10, para. 5.)
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In the second case, a dentist

who engaged in sexual misconduct with five female patients over a
three-year period of time had his licenses revoked.

The sexual

misconduct "occurred while [the dentist] was performing dental
services, and during such time when the patients were under the
influence of nitrous oxide."

(R.27 at pg, 9, para. 2.)

As David

E. Robinson pointed out in his Conclusions of Law relative to
this argument, Petitioner's sexual misconduct with his daughters,
perpetrated in his dental office while the girls were under the
effects of nitrous oxide, more closely resembles the misconduct
of the dentist whose license was revoked than that of the dentist
whose license was placed on probation, due to the fact that in
the former case the sexual misconduct was perpetrated and
facilitated through the use the dentist's licensure and access to
controlled substances.
Petition has failed in his attempt to .explain why the
Division's revocation of his licenses was contrary to prior
practices, and has offered no evidence to support his conclusion
that the decision was arbitrary and capricious.

Moreover, the

decision to revoke Petitioner's licenses does not exceed the
bounds of reasonableness and rationality, and thus, under the
standard pronounced in Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review,,
775 P.2d 439 (Utah App. 1989), this Court should not disturb the
Board's application of its factual findings to the law.
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CONCLUSION
In his conclusion Petitioner argues that, "It would be
reasonable to suspend Petitioner-Appellant's licenses and place
the Petitioner-Appellant on probation for a reasonable period of
time with safe guards (sic) to protect his patients and himself
from false allegations."

(Br. at 21-22.)

Petitioner has failed

to demonstrate why this Court should modify the Board's decision
under the applicable standards of review, nor has he explciined
why the decision and the underlying Findings of Fact and.
Conclusions of Law should be disturbed.

In sum, Petitioner's

arguments are unsupported, and he has failed to meet his burden
of establishing grounds for disturbing the Division's Orders
revoking his licenses.
Respectfully submitted this .^6? day of

^ptfyrthzC

1990
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General of Utah
//

DAVID W.^LUtyD
y I
Assistant At£orjiey General
Tax and Business Regulation Div.
Attorney for Respondent
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